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The Resilience of the Nation State: Cosmopolitanism, Holocaust Memory and 
German Identity 
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Abstract 
 
The aim of this paper is to offer a critique of the proposal of “methodological 
cosmopolitanism” in theoretical terms and to substantiate this critique by providing an 
account of the dynamics of collective memory and identity in postunification 
Germany. In the first part, we look at the arguments about methodological 
cosmopolitanism and their derivative, the idea of cosmopolitan memory, illustrated by 
the case of Holocaust memory. In the second part we look at the case of Germany: 
firstly at its postwar experience of the attempted construction of “postnational” 
identity, and then at more recent trends, contemporaneous with the Berlin Republic, 
towards a “normalization” of national identity in Germany. The Holocaust plays a 
crucial, but different, role in each phase, we suggest. In the conclusion we return to 
more general themes, asking what the German case tells us about the 
cosmopolitanization thesis more generally. 
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Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to offer a critique of the proposal of “methodological 
cosmopolitanism” in theoretical terms and to substantiate this critique by providing an 
account of the dynamics of collective memory and identity in postunification 
Germany. The methodological cosmopolitanism thesis makes a strong challenge to 
analytical frameworks that take for granted the grid of the nation state, for instance by 
supposing that the study of society or politics at least starts, and possibly ends, with 
the study of national societies or nation-state politics. The study of collective memory, 
it has been asserted, has suffered from this defect of misplaced “methodological 
nationalism,” and the example of Holocaust memory has been invoked to demonstrate 
a cosmopolitanization of memory that displays the necessity of methodological 
cosmopolitanism. 
  
     But we argue that the example of Holocaust memory when looked at more closely 
carries quite different lessons. It shows in fact the role of national identity and its 
processes of formation and mutation in the so-called cosmopolitanization of 
Holocaust memory. The latter development, which we agree to have been underway 
for some time, cannot be fully understood without invoking the analytical grid of the 
nation state, in the form of official German national identity and memory discourse. 
Indeed, the process of cosmopolitanization in this case has as its necessary 
complement a process of “decosmopolitanization” or “renationalization” of German 
identity. The example points towards a more nuanced understanding of the interplay 
between cosmopolitan and national memory, which involves an appreciation of the 
durability, even in the face of its constructed nature, of the nation-state and its 
corresponding identity. 
     In the first part, we look at the arguments about methodological cosmopolitanism 
and their derivative, the idea of cosmopolitan memory, illustrated by the case of 
Holocaust memory. In the second part we look at the case of Germany: firstly at its 
postwar experience of the attempted construction of “postnational” identity, and then 
at more recent trends, contemporaneous with the Berlin Republic, towards a 
“normalization” of national identity in Germany. The Holocaust plays a crucial, but 
different, role in each phase, we suggest. In the conclusion we return to wider themes, 
asking what the German case tells us about the cosmopolitanization thesis more 
generally. 
 
Methodological Cosmopolitanism and Cosmopolitan Memory of the Holocaust 
 
While cosmopolitanism has a long tradition as a philosophy of ethical universalism, it 
has recently been promoted by social theorist Ulrich Beck and his colleagues in a 
  
new—or ostensibly new—form as a generic outlook for the social sciences. In this 
section we will begin by focusing attention on a programmatic article by Beck and 
Natan Sznaider that appeared in the British Journal of Sociology in 2006 and whose 
significance was affirmed by its republication when the same journal collected its 
most influential articles in a special issue in 2010.
1
 We continue by looking at a 
contribution by Sznaider and Daniel Levy which develops one of the key claims of 
the methodological cosmopolitanism proposal—that new conceptual frameworks are 
needed to describe and evaluate the “cosmopolitan condition”—by making the case 
for a concept of cosmopolitan memory.
2
 Levy and Sznaider illustrate the utility of this 
concept with the example of Holocaust memory. 
     Beck and Sznaider make a range of briefly illustrated empirical claims about the 
“cosmopolitanization of reality” and “cosmopolitan realism,” found in: 
every field of social and political action: in international organizations, in bi-
national families, in neighbourhoods, in global cities, in transnational military 
organizations, in the management of multi-national co-operations [sic], in 
production networks, human rights organizations, among ecology activists and 
the paradoxical global opposition to globalization.
3
 
 
The authors draw from such empirical phenomena the conclusion that the existing or 
prevailing modes of social science are in need of replacement, because they take for 
granted or presuppose “that the unit of analysis is the national society or the national 
state or the combination of both.”4 Existing modes make “methodological 
nationalism” a “socio-ontological given” whose “basic tenets have become the main 
perceptual grid of the social sciences.”5 “[N]ational organization,” they say, “can no 
longer serve as the organizing reference point.”6 
     In so far as these claims correctly identify a thoughtlessness or lack of critical 
reflection about national societies and polities or a “naturalized conception of nations 
as real communities,”7 they are of course well taken. How far such errors of 
  
unthinking assumption have in fact been made and are in need of rectification is 
debatable, however, and moreover the criticism leaves open the further question of 
whether a thoughtful invocation of or indeed emphasis on the nation state might be 
legitimate. We might therefore be skeptical about the next step in Beck and Sznaider’s 
argument, that a new “methodological cosmopolitanism” is necessary in the face of 
the identified cosmopolitanization of reality: that the cosmopolitan condition demands 
a cosmopolitan outlook. 
     The underlying claim here is that new conditions demand new conceptual 
frameworks. But do they? Surely what we risk by making that claim is simply a 
different form of the error imputed to existing social science by Beck and Sznaider, 
namely the rendering invisible of some important empirical phenomena. It is quite 
plain that existing social science has not been blind to processes often described under 
the headings of globalization, hybridity, or diaspora, as Beck and Sznaider cannot 
help but note. Existing conceptual frameworks have been quite adequate to—and 
arguably are necessary for—the identification of new trends and developments. To 
say to the contrary that they have unavoidably obscured them is to admit the 
possibility that their replacement will do the same for other processes. To overstate to 
this extent the degree of tunnel vision that a conceptual framework imposes is to place 
a question mark at the outset against any attempt to promote a new one. 
     The attempt to differentiate their proposal of methodological cosmopolitanism 
from existing attempts to grasp theoretically the processes of the cosmopolitanization 
of reality produces some convolutions in Beck and Sznaider’s argument. The 
difficulty is to say what is new about it. The novelty of the approach is said at one 
point to inhere in its attention to “an unintended and lived cosmopolitanism,”8 as 
opposed to a reflexive version that continues the cosmopolitan “moral and political 
  
standpoint” that “much of the social scientific discourse has assumed.”9 Shortly 
afterwards, the ground of the claim to novelty is reversed: a novel reflexivity is 
insisted upon. While it is well known, Beck and Sznaider admit, that “[c]apital tears 
down all national boundaries and jumbles together the ‘native’ with the ‘foreign,’” 
they say “[w]hat is new is not forced mixing but global awareness of it, its self-
conscious public affirmation, its reflection and affirmation before a global public 
….”10 From these contortions it is hard to resist the conclusion that it is an intellectual 
brand that is being promoted rather than a new step in knowledge. 
     But let us turn from these general observations about the proposal of 
methodological cosmopolitanism and the associated derogation of methodological 
nationalism (an example, incidentally, of argument by associative labeling, since few 
academics would wish to be thought of as any kind of nationalist) to a real example of 
the new conceptual grid that is said to be required. One such is provided by Levy and 
Sznaider’s discussion of cosmopolitan memory. 
     “Cosmopolitan memories,” Levy and Sznaider write, “provide a new 
epistemological vantage point, one that questions the ‘methodological nationalism’ 
that still prevails in much of the social sciences.”11 Plainly, they are working within 
the program defined by Beck and Sznaider. Accordingly, we find them faulting 
existing approaches to collective memory for seeing it as “bound by tight social and 
political groups like the ‘nation’ or ‘ethnos’” and as being “firmly embedded within 
the ‘Container of the Nation State.’”12 Examples of these defects are identified in the 
influential work of Anthony Smith on national identity and Pierre Nora on “sites of 
memory.” Smith asserts the artificiality and thinness of “global culture” (his similar 
skepticism about “European identity” might be mentioned too),13 while Nora, suggest 
  
Levy and Sznaider, has a “fixation on the nation-state as the sole possible (and 
imaginable) source for the articulation of authentic collective memories.”14 
     Yet, Levy and Sznaider observe, a strong current of thought has emphasized the 
constructed and thus initially artificial nature of nations and national identity. While 
they might have noted that the debate about the formation of national identity is 
hardly settled, or indeed that Smith’s position is far from a mere recapitulation of the 
“primordialist,” as opposed to the “modernist,” side in this debate, it is undoubtedly 
true that understanding of nations, nationalism, and national identity has been much 
enriched by the findings of writers such as Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner, 
Miroslav Hroch, and Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, who have documented the 
processes of construction empirically.
15
 From these observations it must indeed 
follow that the “artificiality” of an identity cannot be an a priori reason for denying 
the possibility of its sociological realization. So far as collective memory is 
concerned, this entails accepting, as many writers have, the distinction made by 
Maurice Halbwachs between lived and historical memories, or the distinction made 
by Jan Assmann between those remembered through person-to-person transmission 
and those memorialized in cultural objectifications.
16
 Hence, collective memories 
become more readily available for use outside the “national container” in which the 
memorialized events took place. 
     Just this, Levy and Sznaider say, is what has happened to collective memory of the 
Holocaust. It has been cosmopolitanized. They provide an ample empirical 
description of this process, dividing it into three phases: the postwar period, the period 
of the “iconographic formation of the Holocaust” from the 1960s to the 1980s, and the 
post Cold War period, in which “new narrative frameworks” have “reconfigured the 
Holocaust as a decontextualized event and contributed to its focal position in the 
  
European memoryscape.”17 Significantly, however, the empirical survey is also 
structured in a second way: spatially, as well as chronologically. This structure is 
constituted by a set of national examples: those of the United States, Israel, and 
Germany. Quite different dynamics are found in the process of collective memory 
construction in each case. 
     In itself this calls into question the claim that the alleged nationcentric grid of 
existing accounts of collective memory needs to be replaced: at most it may be in 
need of supplementation. Levy and Sznaider allude to Peter Novick’s account of the 
evolution of Holocaust memory in the United States,
18
 but Novick’s informative book 
provides considerable illustration of the role of specific political interests and their 
operation in the specific institutional apparatus of the American “national container.” 
Novick’s detail as to motive and setting provides a far more compelling interpretation 
than Levy and Sznaider’s suggestion that “what has pushed the Holocaust to such 
prominence in public thinking relates to the need for a moral touchstone in an age of 
uncertainty,”19 which leaves quite unexplained why this moral touchstone has been 
selected and by whom.  
     Levy and Sznaider try to come to terms with the obvious, but also problematic, 
dependence of their argument for the deficiencies of methodological nationalism on a 
descriptive framework that is itself national. They suggest that “speaking about the 
cosmopolitanization of Holocaust memory does not imply some progressive 
universalism subject to a unified interpretation. The Holocaust does not become one 
totalizing signifier containing the same meanings for everyone.” So far as it goes this 
is useful, though how far our understanding of the relationship is advanced by 
speaking of the “mutual constitution of particular and universal conceptions that 
determine the ways in which the Holocaust can be remembered”20 is questionable, 
  
and not just because of the extreme vagueness of the idea of “mutual constitution.”21 
Left out of this semiotically inflected account of overlapping or mutually constituting 
particular and universal interpretations is the question of who is doing the 
interpreting—the question very much at the forefront of Novick’s analysis. 
     Indeed, that question of the identity of the constructors in the construction of 
identity, which is very much a theme of Anderson, Gellner, Hroch and Hobsbawm 
and Ranger’s constructionist writings on national identity, is absent from the account 
presented by Levy and Sznaider. A further clue to this absence is the manner in which 
the authors take note of the role of the U.S. television drama Holocaust and the film 
Schindler’s List in producing a “decontextualized memory of the Holocaust.” “In its 
‘universalized’ and ‘Americanized’ form,” they write, “it provides Europeans with a 
new sense of ‘common memory.’”22 Such an easy slide from “American” to 
“universal” surely eliminates quite a bit from critical scrutiny, in particular the 
possible advantage for the United States of the recognition of its interests as universal 
imperatives. Such diversion of scrutiny is all the easier under the guidance of a 
prohibition on methodological nationalism. 
     As with Beck and Sznaider’s more general proposal of methodological 
cosmopolitanism, we therefore find here in one of its applications a converse kind of 
indifference to the stubbornly national aspects of collective memory construction. We 
now turn for fuller substantiation of this criticism to the case of Germany. 
 
Germany: From Postnational to National Identity  
 
Levy and Sznaider note that in Germany, as in the other countries they consider, the 
postwar period was one in which the Holocaust did not loom large as a distinct 
element of the memory of the Nazi period and its atrocities and calamities. But this 
  
relative silence obviously did not have the same significance in Germany, East or 
West, as it did in other countries. While the division of Germany was obviously a 
challenge of great magnitude to any construction of identity, the horrors of the 
immediate past were an immense additional burden for German national identity, 
extending their adverse influence indeed over the German past in general, and thus 
over the very idea of German nationhood. 
     Germany’s Nazi past is generally considered to have provided the basic narrative 
of the Federal Republic between 1949 and 1990,
23
 making any identification with the 
nation contentious as well as difficult. The history of the Bonn Republic was 
characterized by a struggle to find a place for the Holocaust and World War II in the 
country’s historical consciousness.24 Even though there was no consensus as to what 
role the Nazi past should play in West Germany’s self-understanding throughout the 
years of division, there is no doubt that the Holocaust and World War II were crucial 
in determining (West) Germany’s self-understanding. Political institutions as well as 
policies and discourse clearly bore the imprint of lessons learned from the past—the 
period 1933 to 1945 was the single most important factor influencing domestic 
developments as well as West Germany’s international status. 
     The difficulty in creating a positive identification with the German nation was 
illustrated by society’s general reluctance to use national symbols.25 Instead it took 
refuge in a kind of postnational or postconventional identity which did not rely on the 
narrow, backward-looking concept of the nation state, but rather anticipated a 
European identity or an identification with liberal democratic values to fill the void at 
the nation-state level which other countries easily filled with pride in their historical 
legacy. To illustrate, the 1992 edition of Facts about Germany, produced in 
cooperation with the German Foreign Office, asserted: “to Germans, nation-state 
  
attitudes are a thing of the past.”26 This assertion is a fine example of the rejection of 
normative nationalism and an embrace of cosmopolitanism as a normative position. 
     The Federal Republic was therefore a model cosmopolitan state, not only in terms 
of Beck and Sznaider’s “normative-philosophical” cosmopolitanism, but also as an 
embodiment, at least incipiently, of the cosmopolitan condition. It showed a 
reluctance to articulate its national interest openly. It embraced Europeanism both as a 
cosmopolitan target of identification and also in part as a set of devices that locked in 
West Germany’s progress beyond the national paradigm. Its general approach to 
foreign policy was characterized by a renunciation of power politics as well as a style 
that showed modesty, moderation, and self-limitation. It was deeply committed to 
rights and values, as expressed (in universal language) in the Basic Law. It showed a 
commitment to multilateralism and a keenness to pool sovereignty in supranational 
structures. West German political elites as well as society at large were model 
Europeans and consistently pro-integrationist, with the idea of Europe and the 
possibility of embracing a new collective identity at the European level providing a 
highly welcome alternative to an identification with the discredited German nation. 
European integration was increasingly favored over the concept of the nation state
27
 
and was considered as a progressive and forward-looking alternative to the outmoded 
and narrow-minded identification with the nation. Political elites as well as the West 
German population at large supported European integration, even if this meant 
financial sacrifices at times, as long as they were in the longer-term interest of the 
European project. In contrast to other European countries like Britain, there was also 
no significant institutionalized opposition to the European project throughout the 
lifetime of the Bonn Republic. West German political elites and society at large were 
  
characterized by what has been described as a “European imperative,”28 “reflexive 
Europeanism,”29 or “quasi-automatic consent” in European matters.30 
     Controversies such as the Historians’ Debate (Historikerstreit) of the 1980s, which 
involved the attempt of some historians to de-emphasize the uniqueness of the Nazi 
period in order to broaden the appreciation of other elements of the national past, 
showed that the achievement of a postnational or cosmopolitan condition in West 
Germany was far from settled or complete. But the presence of cosmopolitan 
elements and aspirations in the state’s own discourse, and that of leading West 
German commentators, was already a distinctive attribute. We do not of course need 
to suppose, naively, that national interest was absent in this period from the 
calculations of West German leaders. There is no doubt, however, that at a minimum 
it expressed itself in a distinctive manner, and in so far as its mode of expression was 
an economic one in the context of the Modell Deutschland, its openness to global 
processes and influences was a starting point of policy not (as in many other settings) 
the end point of an arduous struggle. 
     One might argue about the depth or authenticity of the postnational identity that 
seemed to be under construction in postwar Germany,
31
 though this is not a mode of 
argument available to the writers on collective memory we have been considering, for 
whom arguments asserting national authenticity are precisely examples of the national 
essentialism they seek to combat. Whatever the depth of the postwar 
cosmopolitanization, it is hard to dispute the claim that a significant turn in identity 
discourse occurred after unification. In a nutshell, this discourse defied the claims of 
the advocates of methodological cosmopolitanism by shifting from postnational to 
national. 
  
     At the same time as Holocaust memory has taken its “cosmopolitan turn,” as 
discussed by Levy and Sznaider, collective memory in Germany has been 
characterized by a number of other key developments. Since the generational change 
in German government in 1998 and in particular Gerhard Schröder’s accession to the 
chancellorship, the memory of Germany’s Nazi past has been made a lot more 
palatable. Initiatives undertaken by the Red-Green coalition under Schröder’s 
leadership as of 1998, for example the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe and 
the fund for compensating forced labor, suggested that an acknowledgement of 
culpability was being translated into practice.
32
 It soon became apparent, however, 
that these moves were coupled with very confident expressions of national identity 
which contributed to a “normalization” of Germany, unprecedented in the postwar 
period. 
     Shortly after coming to power, Schröder, the first German chancellor without a 
living memory of the Third Reich, articulated a stance on the Nazi past that bridged 
two previously incompatible positions. Despite unambiguously recognizing German 
culpability, he did not allow the Nazi past to function as an obstacle to a positive 
German national identity. In a November 1998 talk show, for example, Schröder 
declared he planned to represent a Germany that was “less inhibited” and—even more 
astonishing for a center-left coalition leader—one that was “in a positive sense maybe 
even more German.”33 For his generation, he provided a novel perspective on the 
Nazi past and German identity. Whereas positive expressions of national identity had 
previously been deemed impossible because of Auschwitz, as traditionally argued 
among the liberal left, or had to be “historicized,” as maintained by the right, 
Schröder attempted to dissolve this tension by promoting an approach that fully 
acknowledged culpability for crimes committed during the Third Reich, but that did 
  
not prevent the articulation of a positive identification with the German nation, and 
rather confident conduct in general. 
     In his government declaration of 10 November 1998, Schröder referred to the 
“self-confidence of a grown-up nation” which felt neither inferior nor superior 
towards others. He depicted Germany as a nation which faced up to its history and 
acknowledged the responsibilities arising from it.
34
 In a 1999 interview, Schröder 
further explained that, rather than providing a constraint, the readiness of a new 
generation to engage with the Nazi past could become empowering, insofar as it 
created “an opportunity to represent one’s own interests in a more uninhibited 
manner.”35 Schröder clearly promoted further German “normalization,” but this was 
not to happen at the expense of Holocaust memory and German responsibility. 
     At the same time as Holocaust memory was made more “palatable” for 
identificatory purposes, the “Germans as victims” discourse returned suddenly and 
strongly to literary, historical and political debates after the turn of the millennium.
36
 
This discourse, part of which the Merkel governments have proposed to 
institutionalize by creating a Center against Expulsions in Berlin, has to some extent 
offset the exclusive role of perpetrator with which the Holocaust confronts German 
memory, again contributing to the usability of that memory. 
     Concurrently, new narratives of the German nation have emerged which 
emphasize positive aspects of German history such as the achievements of the Bonn 
Republic, the peaceful East German revolution of 1989 and unification, adding up to a 
past that has become much more “usable” in the construction of national identity.37 
     In what appears to be a delayed and indirect response to Michael Stürmer’s 
demand in the Historikerstreit that Germany needs a positive history,
38
 there are 
numerous examples showing that the politics of the past as constructed by 
  
postunification political elites is characterized by a recognition of the achievements of 
German history. The main features of this new narrative of the nation involve success 
and freedom, as evidenced in its emphasis on the Federal Republic’s postwar 
accomplishments as well as the post Wall unity and freedom achieved through the 
peaceful revolution and unification.
39
 
     Not surprisingly, the Federal Republic’s fiftieth anniversary afforded a welcome 
occasion for a politics of the past that could focus on positive aspects of German 
history. With its core principles of freedom, justice, tolerance and peaceful co-
existence, the Basic Law itself (with a degree of historical determinism) could be 
claimed, as it was by Federal President Roman Herzog, to be both the starting point of 
and the driving force behind the process that led from the foundation of the FRG to 
unification.
40
 Two years earlier, then Bundesrat President and Minister President of 
Baden-Württemberg, Erwin Teufel, had praised the constitution’s authors for their 
wisdom. They “not only stipulated the goal of unity and the commitment to 
unification, but also, via article twenty-three, prepared the path for the East German 
states to join.” He further credited them with “keeping this path open by not giving up 
on their demand for self-determination for the Germans in the GDR and by 
consistently rejecting a separate citizenship for them.”41 The provisions and politics of 
the Bonn Republic are thus held to have been instrumental in bringing about 
unification—this is one of the many achievements claimed in depicting the Bonn 
Republic as a success story. 
     If Bonn’s success story emerges as a core theme in the official memory discourse 
subsequent to unification, then one occasion in particular stands out. Considering the 
occasion, it may have been a rather ill-fitting title, but in a speech with the title 
Begabung zur Freiheit (Talent for Freedom) the then Federal President Horst Köhler 
  
used the sixtieth anniversary celebrations marking the end of World War II to paint in 
the brightest of colors a history of postwar Germany in which the reason for the 
anniversary, i.e., the Third Reich and World War II, seemed to be very much glossed 
over. The denazification process is described as “going too far by some critics and not 
going far enough by others;” and it is claimed that the country had succeeded in 
“banning the leading Nazis as a group from political life.” Köhler refers to the early 
postwar reluctance of Germans to discuss the atrocities committed as a “silence on 
which both victims and perpetrators often agreed,” suggesting it might have been 
“necessary in order for the people to be able to take a step back and start from 
scratch.”42 
     In this narrative, German history is not a hindrance but rather offers another 
opportunity for showcasing the country as a success story: “We see our country in its 
entire history, which is why we realize how much good there is that we can connect 
with in order to overcome the moral ruin of the years from 1933 to 1945.” Included in 
this good history claimed by Köhler are enlightenment thinkers like Gotthold Ephraim 
Lessing and Immanuel Kant, the ideas of the 1848 revolution, the nineteenth century 
development of the legal system, and the ideals of the labor movement, as well as the 
heritage of the German resistance to fascism, to mention just a few.
43
 
     Köhler’s speech is among the clearest of contemporary examples of national 
identity construction by a political leader. He constructs a history of post 1945 
Germany and frames it as a complete success story, in which any problems can be 
overcome: the positive always prevails. He acknowledges that dissent has been one of 
the main features of the Bonn Republic—on issues such as the market economy, 
rearmament, NATO and European Union membership, and Ostpolitik. Yet he leaves no 
room for doubt regarding his final claim, that there is an overarching consensus: 
  
“Hindsight shows clearly that all these decisions were right, something the large 
majority of the people as well as the respective parliamentary opposition ended up 
realizing.” The Bonn Republic, as constructed by Köhler, is a country whose success 
as a democracy is beyond doubt or question. Its success as a democracy is in turn 
utilized to legitimize an imperfect present and thus protect it against criticism: “Sixty 
years after World War II, our country is facing some difficulties … But Germany is a 
stable democracy.” This construct serves to justify a positive national identity to be 
embraced by Germans without much self-doubt or modesty. Köhler reminds us that 
alongside the “feeling of gratitude towards those who helped build the country,” there 
remains “the conviction that we Germans have gone down the path towards freedom 
and democracy out of our own talent for freedom.”44 
     These examples, among many others that could be cited, of the more positive and 
uninhibited construction of German national identity and national memory by its 
highest state officials, do not by any means contradict the idea that Holocaust memory 
has been cosmopolitanized. But they hardly show the irrelevance of the nation-state to 
this process. Levy and Sznaider indeed make a revealing acknowledgement of just 
this: 
The post-Cold War era and the aftermath of reunification … compelled Germany 
to find a new political and cultural place in Europe. It did so by pursuing a dual 
strategy centering the Holocaust as an integral part of national history (see for 
instance the decade-long debate regarding the memorial in Berlin), and 
simultaneously decentering it by turning the Holocaust into a European event 
…45 
 
Here a cui bono argument is clearly implied, and the “who” that benefits is Germany. 
This is already enough to call into question the precept of methodological 
cosmopolitanism. To substantiate the claim of a German “strategy” would raise the 
question even more explicitly, which may in part account for the absence of any 
attempt to do so on Levy and Sznaider’s part. It would in fact be difficult to show the 
  
existence of deliberate strategizing about Holocaust memory on the part of German 
leaders. Nevertheless, our brief survey of their discourse on national identity shows 
quite clearly the rhetorical advantage the decentering of the Holocaust has for the 
construction of national collective memory. 
     We will not have properly understood the process if it is seen only as a 
disembodied one whereby the memory of the Holocaust comes to serve some general 
purpose such as a yearning for meaning and moral certitude in the face of globalizing 
pressures. Germany has been able to offload Holocaust memory, which has indeed 
become a global phenomenon. With that noxious material expelled from the national 
container, far from the container “cracking,”46 its refurbishment could proceed. The 
irony that one has to look at state interests, as expressed with a fair degree of 
concreteness by high officials, in order to understand properly the process of 
cosmopolitanization of memory is compounded when one looks at the contrast 
between such expressions before and after unification, or more specifically the 
generational change of 1998. Germany has moved away from a cosmopolitan 
construction of its own identity over this period, towards a more familiar national 
one.
47
 It is a case, at least in part, of “de-cosmopolitanization.” 
 
Conclusion: Understanding Cosmopolitanization and the Perils of 
Methodological Cosmopolitanism 
 
That there exists a real process of cosmopolitanization, that cosmopolitan memory is 
one of its symptomatic phenomena, and that Holocaust memory is in turn an example 
of this phenomenon, is unquestionable,
48
 and it has not been our purpose in this article 
to question it. The question instead is how the general process, the symptomatic 
phenomenon, and the example are to be understood. Our purpose has been to express 
doubt as to the claim that a new conceptual apparatus is required and that the existing 
  
one is vitiated by a defective methodological nationalism. We agree with Claire 
Sutherland, who in a forthcoming book discusses the “cosmopolitan challenge,” but 
notes that it does not imply the decline of either the nation state or nationalist 
ideology.
49
 We have used the case of Germany, raised directly of course by the 
Holocaust memory example, to expand upon our theoretical objections with some 
empirical evidence. We will now summarize and restate our objections. 
     The thesis of “cosmopolitanization of reality” has as one of its implications the 
erosion of the nation-state “container” of social, political and cultural processes. The 
nation state is neither primordial nor eternal, empirically, and is indeed not 
exhaustive, analytically, so no a priori assumption that insisted that it is would be 
legitimate. Yet to allow the necessity of empirical investigation of this erosion process 
is far from justifying a conceptual shift away from the nation-state. The need for such 
a shift has been argued in the past, most famously by Karl Marx, and it is equally 
notorious that the blind spot created in the empirical gaze of Marxism became one of 
its chief weaknesses. 
     More recently, the empirical relevance of the nation state has been challenged by 
investigations under the heading of “multi-level governance.”50 This, too, has coupled 
a conceptual shift with a shift in empirical attention. But the shift from “government” 
to “governance” by which the decentering of the nation state is achieved in this case 
has also, like the conceptual revision we are discussing, concealed as much as it has 
revealed. The agenda of good governance, for example, is arguably an agenda that 
installs the interests of certain states over those of others, with the significant addition 
that the inequality is established covertly. For some states, more governance (for 
instance by the World Trade Organization, WTO) means less government, but for 
others the relationship is positive-sum, to the extent that their national interests are 
  
enhanced by the activities of the WTO and are indeed disproportionately influential in 
its policy.
51
 The resulting inequalities and power differentials cannot be seen except 
with a lens that places the nation-state at its focal point. 
     The nation-state, and in particular its political leadership, though its journalists and 
commentators should not be ignored, remains a prime source of the imaginary that, by 
constituting the national community, maintains the nation state’s own existence. This 
is no uniform fact, and is by all means subject to differentiation across space, but in 
this regard it would be particularly damaging to lose sight of the power differentials 
that are involved: to forget, for example, the difference between “universalism” and 
“Americanism” (as proponents of the latter are wont to do). One can see these 
differentials only by remaining fully aware of the central organizing role of the nation 
state. Neither is the centrality of the nation state an eternal fact: it varies over time, as 
the cosmopolitanization thesis suggests. The example of Germany, however, shows 
that the variation is not always in a single direction. 
     The cosmopolitanization and, linked to that, partial de-Germanization of Holocaust 
memory has meant that Germany has, to a degree, shaken off the past. The memory of 
the Holocaust and World War II has lost its predictable grip on policy and discourse 
in the Berlin Republic and no longer constitutes the basic narrative of the German 
polity. Evidence of this can be seen in the way the political elites of the Berlin 
Republic have lost their reluctance to express Germany’s national interest much more 
openly and in a less inhibited manner. At the same time as (West) Germany’s model 
Europeanism has waned, the pursuit of its national interest has grown. As we have 
shown, this is increasingly underpinned by a new narrative of the nation which 
emphasizes positive aspects of German history. The national container is thus being 
replenished with a more usable past.  
  
     Beck and Sznaider assert that “even the re-nationalization or re-ethnification of 
minds, cultures and institutions has to be analysed within a cosmopolitan frame of 
reference”.52 The case of Germany if anything shows the reverse of Beck and 
Sznaider’s contention: that cosmopolitanization is most profitably analyzed within a 
national frame of reference. 
 
Stephen Welch is a Lecturer in the School of Government and International Affairs 
at the University of Durham, UK. He is the author of The Concept of Political Culture 
(Macmillan/St Martin’s Press, 1993) and of articles or chapters on political culture, 
political scandal and American politics. 
  
Ruth Wittlinger is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Government and International 
Affairs at the University of Durham, UK. She has published on post-unification 
Germany, European integration, British perceptions of Germany and the Germans and 
politics and literature. Her new monograph German National Identity in the Twenty-
First Century: A Different Republic After All? was published by Palgrave in October 
2010. 
 
Notes 
 
1
 Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznaider, “Unpacking Cosmopolitanism for the Social 
Sciences: A Research Agenda,” British Journal of Sociology 61, no. s1, Special 
Issue: “The BJS: Shaping Sociology over 60 Years” (2010), 381–403. 
2
 Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, “Memory Unbound: The Holocaust and the 
Formation of Cosmopolitan Memory,” European Journal of Social Theory 5, no. 
1 (2002), 87–106. 
3
 Beck and Sznaider (see note 1), 383. 
4
 Ibid., 382f. 
5
 Ibid., 384f. 
6
 Ibid., 384. 
7
 Ibid., 384. 
8
 Ibid., 387; Beck and Sznaider’s italics. 
9
 Ibid.,  386. 
  
 
10
 Ibid., 390; Beck and Sznaider’s italics. 
11
 Levy and Sznaider (see note 2), 103. 
12
 Ibid., 88. 
13
 Anthony D. Smith, “National Identity and the Idea of European Unity,” 
International Affairs 68, no. 1 (1992), 55–76. 
14
 Levy and Sznaider (see note 2), 90. It is debatable whether it is the nation state 
whose erosion Nora laments, or rather “a tradition of memory” itself, existing “in 
gestures and habits, in skills passed down by unspoken traditions, in the body’s 
inherent self-knowledge, in unstudied reflexes and ingrained memories.” Indeed it 
is surely the “history” that Nora regretfully says has replaced memory that more 
closely relates to the nation state. See Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and 
History: Les Lieux de Mémoire,” Representations, no. 26, Special Issue: “Memory 
and Counter-Memory” (1989), 7–24, quotations at 11, 13. 
15
 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and 
Spread of Nationalism (London, 1983); Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism 
(Oxford, 1983); Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in 
Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups 
among the Smaller European Nations, new edn (New York, 2000); Eric 
Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge, 
1983). 
16
 Levy and Sznaider (see note 2), 91. 
17
 Ibid., 97. 
18
 Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life (New York, 1999). 
19
 Levy and Sznaider (see note 2), 93. 
20
 Ibid., 92. 
  
 
21
 For a critique of the use of this formula—which she dubs “central conflation”—in 
the work of several prominent social theorists, see Margaret A. Archer, Culture 
and Agency: The Place of Culture in Social Theory (Cambridge, 1988), 76–80. 
22
 Levy and Sznaider (see note 2), 100. 
23
 See for example, Michael Schwab-Trapp, “Der Nationalsozialismus im 
öffentlichen Diskurs über militärische Gewalt,” in Die NS-Diktatur im deutschen 
Erinnerungsdiskurs, ed. Wolfgang Bergem (Opladen, 2003), 171–85, 173.  
24
 See for example Martin Broszat, Nach Hitler. Der schwierige Umgang mit 
unserer Geschichte (Munich, 1988), Mary Fulbrook, German National Identity 
after the Holocaust (Cambridge, 1999) and Charles Maier, The Unmasterable 
Past: History, Holocaust and German Identity (Cambridge, 1988). 
25
 For a discussion of this, see Peter Reichel, Schwarz-Rot-Gold. Kleine Geschichte 
deutscher Nationalsymbole (Munich, 2005). 
26
 Facts about Germany (Frankfurt, 1992), 165. 
27
 See Manuela Glaab, “Einstellungen zur deutschen Einheit” in Handbuch zur 
deutschen Einheit 1949–1989–1999, ed. Werner Weidenfeld and Karl-Rudolf 
Korte (Frankfurt/Main, 1999), 306–16, 310. 
28
 Frank Brunssen, Das neue Selbstverständnis der Berliner Republik (Würzburg, 
2005), 27. 
29
 William E. Paterson, “Does Germany Still Have a European Vocation?,” 
European Research Working Paper Series, Institute for German Studies/European 
Research Institute, 15 (2006), 13. 
30
 Christian Schweiger, Britain, German and the European Union (Basingstoke, 
2007), 62. 
  
 
31
 Konrad H. Jarausch, After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945–1995 (Oxford, 
2006). 
32
 Ideas for a national memorial had emerged in the 1980s. For a discussion of this, 
and Helmut Kohl’s position, see Bill Niven, Facing the Nazi Past: United 
Germany and the Legacy of the Third Reich (London, 2002), 194–232. In view of 
his comments regarding the “grace of a late birth,” as he put it in a speech to the 
Israeli Knesset, Kohl’s contribution to the commemoration of the Holocaust faced 
significant limits. See Ruth Wittlinger, German National Identity in the 21st 
Century: A Different Republic After All? (Basingstoke, 2010), 23. 
33
 Quoted in Werner A. Perger “Wir Unbefangenen”, Die Zeit, 12 November 1998. 
34
 Gerhard Schröder, Regierungserklärung, 10 November 1998. 
35
 Gerhard Schröder, Interview, Die Zeit, 4 February 1999. 
36
 This discourse initially mainly related to victims of the allied bombing raids and 
Germans who faced expulsions towards the end of the war and in its immediate 
aftermath, but later also extended to other groups such as German prisoners of war 
in the Soviet Union and women who were raped by soldiers of the Red Army. For 
a discussion of the “Germans as victims” discourse, see Bill Niven, ed., Germans 
as Victims (Basingstoke, 2006) and Eric Langenbacher, “Changing Memory 
Regimes in Contemporary Germany”, German Politics and Society 21, no. 2, 
(2003), 46–68. 
37
 For the idea of a “usable past” see Robert G. Moeller, War Stories: The Search for 
a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany (Berkeley, 2001). 
38
 Michael Stürmer, “Geschichte im geschichtslosen Land,” Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, 26 November 1986. 
  
 
39
 For a more detailed discussion, see Ruth Wittlinger and Steffi Boothroyd, “A 
‘Usable’ Past At Last? The Politics of the Past in United Germany”, German 
Studies Review 33, no. 3 (2010), 489–502.  
40
 Roman Herzog, “Ansprache des Bundespräsidenten,” 23 May 1999. 
41
 Erwin Teufel, “Ansprache des Präsidenten des Bundesrates,” 3 October 1997. 
42
 Horst Köhler, “Begabung zur Freiheit,” 8 May 2005. 
43
 Ibid. 
44
 Ibid. 
45
 Levy and Sznaider (see note 2), 97. 
46
 Ibid., 88. 
47
 For a fuller discussion of recent changes to German national identity, see 
Wittlinger (see note 32).  
48
 It does not follow that all the empirical claims of the cosmopolitanization thesis 
need to be accepted, any more than the related claim of globalization has gone 
unchallenged empirically. See for instance Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, 
Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of 
Governance (Oxford, 1999) and David Marsh, Nicola J. Smith and Nicola Hothi, 
“Globalization and the State,” in The State: Theories and Issues, eds. Colin Hay, 
Michael Lister and David Marsh (Basingstoke and New York, 2006), 172–89. 
49
 Claire Sutherland, Nationalism in the 21st Century: Challenges and Responses 
(Basingstoke, forthcoming), Preface. 
50
 Ian Bache and Matthew Flinders, eds., Multi-Level Governance (Oxford, 2004). 
51
 Stephen Welch and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, “Multi-Level Governance and 
International Relations,” in Bache and Flinders (see note 50), 127–44. 
52
 Beck and Sznaider (see note 1), 385. 
 
